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The Role of Community in Migration Dynamics 
 
Summary 
In this paper, we present a theoretical model that, implementing the pioneering work of 
Burda (1995), based on the Real Option Theory, investigates the roots of the migration 
dynamics. In the model the decision to migrate of each individual depends not only on 
the wage differential, but also on a U-shaped benefit function of a community of 
homogeneous ethnic individuals, modelled according to the "theory of clubs". The 
theoretical results are able to give an explanation to the observable "jumps" in the 
migration flows and to describe how the trigger for entry can change depending on the 
dimension of the district. The analysis of the results also sheds light on the dynamics of 
the districts’ development: some possible rigidities in the adjustment of the district 
dimension, as regards the optimal levels, could magnify the hysteresis process. 
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Generally, in economic literature, migration depends on the wealth diﬀerence
between two countries or two lands, because mainly "people migrate in order
to increase their welfare"1.T h i sf a c ti m p l i e st h a tm i g r a n t se n t e ran e ws o c i e t y
when the expected value of their beneﬁts minus their costs is greater than zero.
After an individual enters a new society, she begins to build a group of people
based on aﬃnities, religions and the same way of life: this group is generally
called "community". This aggregate of individuals that uses, like a family,
t h es a m eg o o d s ,“ deriving mutual beneﬁt sharing [...] production costs, the
members’ characteristics, or a good characterised by excludable beneﬁts”, can
be modelled by following economic theory of "club" (Sandler and Tschirhart,
1980; Buchanan, 1965; Berglas, 1976). The aim of this paper consists in studying
how the community, modelled as a club, inﬂuences an individual’s decision to
migrate. To formulate the choice of the migrant, we use a real option approach as
developed in recent literature by Burda (1995), Khwaja (2002) and Anam et al.
(2004). We particularly want to stress how the decision to migrate, depending on
wage diﬀerences and the beneﬁts coming from a community, aﬀects the dynamics
of migrant ﬂows into a country. The theoretical results are perfectly in line with
the observable data and try to give an explanation to the observable jumps in
the migration dynamics.
1.1 Some supporting evidence
Figure 1 below shows the four main migration nationalities in Italy and their
growth rates in the period considered. The data are taken from the oﬃcial
national statistic database (ISTAT) for the years between 1994 and 2000 and
from Caritas report for the period between 2001 and 2003. The migration
ﬂows are deplated from the two important regolarizations for illegal immigrants
introduced in Italy in 1996 and 1998, and registrated by the ISTAT database
in the subsequent years. For the sake of completeness, Figure 2 shows also the
the italian ﬂow to Usa between 1960 and 1984, by using the Istat database. It
is observable that, in both the cases, the migration process does not proceed in
a smooth manner, but it shows some jumps in its dynamics, especially at the
beginning of the phenomena, as if a mass of individuals is waiting for something
to happen in order to decide to migrate.
1Khwaja, Y., ”Should I Stay or Should I Go? Migration Under Uncertainty: A Real Option































































Figure 1: Migration Jumps





































































Figure 2: Italian Flows to Usa
Which is the reason why do they wait before taking their decision to migrate?
3What are they waiting for? And why do they move in a mass? The aim of this
paper consists in answerring to these questions by verifying if the characteristic
of investment of migration and the role of ethnic groups, behind any migration
decision, can explain the migration jumps observed in Figure 1.
We proceed in the following manner: in Section 2, we explain the model.
Sections 3 and 4 show the main results, namely the optimal migration strategy in
t h ep r e s e n c eo fp o s i t i v ea n dn e g a t i v ee x t e r nalities. Finally, Section 5 summarises
the conclusions.
2M i g r a t i o n A s I n v e s t m e n t
Can migration decision be thought as an investment choice? In the light of the
economic literature, it seems that the answer to this question is "Yes". In fact,
according to Sjaastad (1962), "people migrate if the discounted stream of earn-
ings in the destination exceeds that of the origin by more than a ﬁxed, one-time
cost of migration". The same statement is advisable in Bowles (1970): “the
decision process concerning migration may be viewed fruitfully as a comparison
of the present value of the beneﬁts and costs of moving”. In this regard, Burda
(1995) and Khawaja (2002) apply the theory of real option, generally used to
study investment decision, to the migration choice. In particular, which are the
main variables aﬀecting decision to migrate? In literature, the wage gap is gen-
erally considered the only variable that aﬀects the decision to migrate (Burda,
1995; Todaro, 1969), but according to some recent works, it may not be suf-
ﬁcient to explain migration ﬂows completely. In Moretti’s paper (1998), the
author sheds light on the speciﬁc role of the ethnic community on the migration
waves. In particular, he proposes a model in which "the probability of migrat-
ing to a country depends positively on the social networks that link the migrant
to that country". Another recent work (Bauer, Epstein and Gang, 2002) ex-
amines the relative importance and interaction of two alternative explanations
of immigrant clustering: 1) network externalities and 2) herd behaviour. The
same theme is studied in Epstein and Gang (2004), where the authors examine
the roles "other people" play in inﬂuencing an individual’s potential migration
decision.
Therefore, if migration coice can also be thought as an investment choice,
it is possible to use the Burda approach to study migration dynamics, even if,
so far, the analysis has been focused on the decision to migrate of only one
individual. What might happen if each individual chose to move to a host
country with regards to other immigrants? What might happen if in the host
country there existed a community of other homogeneous individuals that helped
her to increase her beneﬁts? This assumption is not far from recent economic
literature (Moretti, 1998; Winters et al. , 2001; Coniglio, 2003; Munshi, 2003;
Bauer et al., 2002; Epstein and Gang, 2004; Bauer and Zimmermann, 1997).
In the next steps we deﬁne a simple real option model and we combine this
framework with the classical theory of clubs for stressing the role of community
in the migration choice.
42.1 The model
This section presents a continuous-time model of migration where the diﬀerential
beneﬁts of migration, including the wage diﬀerential, evolves in a stochastic
manner over time and there is ongoing uncertainty.
We can summarise our assumptions in the following manner:
1. There exist two countries: the country of origin where each potential
migrant takes her decision and the host country.
2. At any time t each individual is free to decide to migrate to a new country.
Individuals discount the future beneﬁts at the interest rate ρ.
3. All immigrants are identical, are inﬁnitely-lived, or choose vicariously for
their descendants who will remain in the receiving country forever2.T h e i r
size dn is inﬁnitesimally small with respect to the total number of inhab-
itants.
4. Each individual enters a new country undertaking a single irreversible
investment which requires an initial sunk cost K.
5. The wage diﬀerential for each migrant, called x, follows a geometric diﬀu-
sion process:
dx = αxdt + σxdw (1)
with x0 = x and α,σ>0. The component dw is a Weiner disturbance de-
ﬁned as dw(t)=ε(t)
√
dt,w h e r eε(t) ∼ N(0,1) is a white noise stochastic
process (see Cox and Miller, 1965). The Weiner component dw is there-
fore normally distributed with zero expected value and variance equal to:
dw ∼ N(0,dt). From these assumptions and from the (1) we know that
E [dw]=0 ; E [dx]=αxdt.
6. In the host country there is a community of ethnically homogeneous in-
dividuals. Each individual becomes a member (ﬁnding a job) instanta-
neously when she enters the host country.
7. The community net beneﬁt function for each member is U-shaped with
regards to the number of members.
By these hypotheses and assuming θ0 = θ and n0 = n, the value of migrating
to the host country is:
















2It is possible to show that the "sudden death" formulation is a very natural generalisation
of the inﬁnite-life case (Dixit and Pindyck, 1993, p.205).
5where J[τi=t] is the indicator function that assumes the values one or zero
depending on whether the argument is true or false, and the expectation is taken
considering that the number of immigrants may change over time by new entry.
The next step consists in: i) deﬁning function u[n(t)] according to micoeco-
nomics theory; ii) solving (2) by using real option approach (see Appendix).
2.2 Ethnic community and the theory of clubs
We assume that an ethnic community can be modelised as a "club", in the light
of theory of clubs’ deﬁnitions. In fact, a community generally arises for mutal
economic beneﬁts and its members have generally the same characteristics, the
same way of life and, sometimes, follow the same religion: all these aﬃnities form
strong ties that can push the individuals to help one another to share the cost
of housing (as shown in the Ares2000_Onlus report) or the costs of structures,
like churches or cultural centres. This assertion is in line with McGuire (1972,
1974), Sadler and Tschirthart (1980), Bauer and Zimmermann (1997) and also
with Locher (2001). Nevertheless, clubs involve sharing and this fact often leads
to a partial rivalry of beneﬁts as larger memberships crowd one another, causing
a detraction in the quality of services received. This implies that a high number
of members could induce increasing congestion costs, e.g. crowded houses or
competition on the labour market3. The parallelism between community and
theory of clubs is also conﬁrmed by an extension of Buchanan and Goetz (1972)
on the Tiebout model (1956)4.T h e t r a d e - o ﬀ between cost sharing and con-
gestion is at the centre of collective good models that follow Buchanan (1965)
and Tiebout (1956) and it guarantees a U-shaped average cost of provision and
hence a unique minimum average cost, as shown by Edwards (1992).
Then, we present a model in which the immigrants undertake the decision
to migrate with regards to three variables: wage diﬀerential between country of
origin and the host country (as we can see in a great deal of literature on mi-
gration: Todaro, 1969; Harris-Todaro, 1970; Burda, 1995; Bencinverga-Smith,
1997); a ﬁxed cost (travel costs and some psychological costs) and the net ben-
eﬁts stemming from the resident community in the host country.
2.2.1 The beneﬁtf u n c t i o n
L e tu sa s s u m et h a tt h em i g r a n ti sa l r e a d yi nt h eh o s tc o u n t r y : s h eb e l o n g s
to her ethnic community in a district where there are diﬀerent local public
goods (G), such as churches, cultural centres and houses belonging to a group
of homogeneous individuals. To describe the sum of buildings belonging to the
community, as a public good, we follow the considerations of Edwards5.
3An idea of congestion costs in a host country is introduced by Coniglio (2003).
4According to these statements, if the total cost of using a common good is the sum of
average cost plus congestion cost, when the number of users (i.e. the size of the community)
increases, there is an initial fall in costs (an increase in net beneﬁt) and a subsequent rise in
integration costs when the congestion eﬀect becomes greater.
5“there also exist collective solutions (...) among these are clubs, public provision and
informal sharing arrangements (roommates)”
6Let us assume for simplicity that the individual utility function is a quasi
linear function, that is:
U (y,g(G,n)) = y + g(G,n) (3)
Where y is the members consumption of the private good, G is her consump-
tion of the club good, and n is the membership size. Since the utilisation rate
of the club good is the same for all members, we have gi = G for all members,
where gi is the ith member’s utilisation rate of the club facility, and G is the
size of the club facility.
Each member attempts to maximise utility subject to a resource constraint,
x = y + C (G,n)/n (4)
where:
∂g/∂G > 0;∂g/∂n < 0
∂C/∂G > 0;∂C/∂n > 0
x is the wage diﬀerential6 x = xh−xo, respectively between the wage of the host
country (h) and the wage of the country of origin (o). Simplifying our analysis,
we assume that xo is equal to zero; the price of the private good is unity, and
C (•) is the club’s cost7.
It is possible to demonstrate8 that, for a given level of G (i.e. in the instant
t), the migrant’s utility function can be reduced to:
U(x,n)=x + θu(n) (5)
where θ is a scale factor. The function u(n) is twice continuously diﬀeren-
tiable in n, and it is increasing over the interval [0,n) and decreasing thereafter.
That is, there exist positive externalities if the individual enters the commu-
nity. After n the costs increase more than the beneﬁts because of the increasing
congestion eﬀect. We also assume that at zero and at some ﬁnite number of
members N,t h eb e n e ﬁts fall to zero (i.e. θu(n)=0 , and θu(N)=0 ) 9.
Let us rearrange ﬁgure 10.1 of Cornes R., Sandler T. (1986, page 169) in
ﬁgure 3. Quadrant II shows the function u(n) as the vertical diﬀerence between
the gross beneﬁt function and the costs10 per member: the resultant bold line
is the net beneﬁt per person associated with changing membership size, when
the district size is ﬁxed at G1,G 2,G ∗ units.
6Dustmann (2003): “In a simple static model, migration increases with the wage diﬀeren-
tial between host- and home-country”.
7Superscripts are dropped, from now on, whenever members are homogeneous.
8see Vergalli S., ”Migration Dynamics”, Ph.D. thesis, 2005, University of Padua.
9These theoretical results can be also explained by using a typical representation of theory
of clubs taken by Sandler and Tschirhart (1980).
10The cost curves depict the cost per member when a facility of a given size is shared by a
varying number of members.
7Figure 3: Beneﬁtf u n c t i o n
The shape of these curves indicates that camaraderie is eventually overpow-
ered by crowding, and at that point the beneﬁt per person begins to decline.
Starting at the initial instant t of the migrant’s choice, our assumption is that
she knows the number of members of the community and the size of the district
G0. Her entry modiﬁes the optimal couple (i.e. the dimension of the district
and the optimal value of the number of the community’s members): a new level
of members needs a greater dimension of the club; this fact pushes the curves
upwards and identiﬁes a new optimal couple. This process continues until a new
stable equilibrium is reached. Nevertheless, because of the instantaneity of the
p r o c e s s ,t h eo n l yc u r v eo b s e r v a b l eb yt h em i g r a n ti st h ee n v e l o p eo ft h ef a m i l y
of functions, i.e. the bold line in the quadrant II. The result is a U-shaped func-
tion11 which corresponds to the increment of beneﬁts that each migrant could
obtain if she entered the community12.
3M a i n R e s u l t s
Result 1 The optimal entry policy for each migrant, characterised by a mass
of other migrants n ≥ n, is described by the upward-sloping curve (Figure
11That is the envelope of the family of the U-shaped functions.
12The same result can also be easily derived from the U-shaped cost curve used by McGuire
(1974, Fig. 1b, page 118). The conclusion is that the graphic solution, displayed in ﬁgure 1.3,
















where ρ>αand β1 > 1 is the positive root of the auxiliary quadratic
equation Ψ(β)=1
2σ2β(β − 1) + αβ − ρ =0 .
Proof. See the Appendix
Result 2 The candidate policy for a mass of individuals n<n is described by
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Figure 4: Optimal Policy
In fact, in the case of negative externalities, i.e. for n ∈ [n,N),i ft h e
diﬀerential wage x climbs to a trigger level x∗, migration will become feasible
but, at the moment of entry, the total beneﬁt declines along the function u(n)
due to congestion eﬀects: we have a reﬂecting barrier.T h e d i ﬀerential wage
9continues to move stochastically until a new entry episode occurs and the ﬂow
hits the optimal number n. This case is a setting of competitive equilibrium in
which every migrant is "totally myopic in the matter of other migrant’s entry
decision" (Dixit and Pindyck, 1993, p.291). In this way the "optimal competitive
equilibrium policy need not take account of the eﬀect of entry" (Moretto, 2003,
p.8) and the wage level
◦
x that triggers entry by the single migrant in isolation,
is the same as that of the migrant who correctly anticipates the other migrants’
strategies x∗13.
If instead we consider the migrant’s beneﬁt function along the increasing
part, that is n ∈ [0,n), any potential entrant is subject to positive externalities,
so their value of entering depends on the number of migrants already entered the
community. Thus the timing of the decision is inﬂuenced by the decisions of the
others: the single entrant cannot claim to be the last to enter the community14.
Therefore, the higher the number of members the greater the beneﬁts that the
individual obtains if she enters. The network beneﬁts make the individual face
a choice between no entry and agreement. However, as all individuals are sub-
ject to the same stochastic shock, two equilibrium patterns are possible: either
the community remains locked-in at the initial size, sustained by self-fulﬁlling
pessimistic expectations (inﬁnite delay), or a mass of individuals simultaneously
rushes to enter. Excluding the former15,w eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n g :
Proposition 1 If the beneﬁt function of belonging to an ethnic community is
U-shaped, all the immigrants wait until the threshold level reaches the maximum.
At x∗(n) they co-ordinate migration together, causing a "jump" in the migration
dynamic.
Proof. See the Appendix B
Therefore, in aggregate,
Proposition 2 the eﬀect of a community is the reduction of the migration costs
through the network system: this fact implies a lower threshold level that triggers
the entry.
13The myopic behaviour implies that:
1. the migrant is ignoring that future entry by other migrants will reduce her net beneﬁts.
Other things equal, this would make entry more attractive for the migrant that behaves
myopically;
2. she ignores the fact that the prospect of future entry by other migrants reduces the
option value of waiting. In fact, pretending to be the last to enter the host country,
she thinks that she still has a valuable option to wait before making an irreversible
decision. Other things equal, this makes the decision to enter less attractive. The two
eﬀects oﬀset each other, allowing the migrant to act as she were in isolation.
14Leahy’s results cannot be extended to this case.
15We exclude the former by using subgame-perfectness arguments (see Moretto (2003)).
104G r a p h i c S o l u t i o n
Figure 5: Optimal trigger
In ﬁgure 5 we extend ﬁgure 4, by adding the optimal trigger levels in quad-
rant V. Let us start in the instant t with a given dimension G1 of the district.
According to the theory of clubs16 t h ep r o c e s so fc o n v e r g e n c eu n t i lt h eo p t i m a l
couple (G∗,n) is reached instantaneously: this fact implies that the migrant’s
optimal policy moves along the envelope curve of the diﬀerent threshold levels
for diﬀerent community dimensions, i.e. the lowest U-shaped curve (the bold
black and red line17 in quadrant V). Nevertheless, when the network eﬀect pre-
16In Cornes and Sandler: “the community [club] desires a membership n1 when the dimen-
sion of the district is G1; however, a larger district size G2 is required to maximise average
net beneﬁts (in quadrant I) when membership is n1”.
17It is worth noting that the red line corresponds to the optimal policy of one migrant as if
11vails (see result 2), the optimal policy consists of waiting until n individuals are
co-ordinated to enter: this implies that the optimal diﬀerential wage perceived
by each migrant is the ﬂat bold black line in quadrant V. How can change our
model if the adjustment of the district size is not instantaneous? Some possible
scenarios:
1. The dimension of the district changes very slowly when immigrants enter:
in this case, if the equilibrium is far from the optimal couple, the new
level of members requires an increase of the variable G. The migration
dynamic should evolve according to the following path: an initial mass of
entries, followed by an individual entry (due to the crowding eﬀect and
t h em y o p i cb e h a v i o u ro ft h em i g r a n t ) . T h es u b s e q u e n ti n c r e a s eo ft h e
district size continues the process of convergence until the optimal couple
is reached. Therefore, the migrant entry process should follow the dotted
line shown in quadrant V of the ﬁgure 4. This non-instantaneous process
could imply two types of eﬀects:
(a) the hysteresis phenomenon is ampliﬁed by the slowness of the devel-
opment of the district: migrants wait until the number of members
reaches the level n;
(b) immigrants are short-sighted and they are not able to correctly fore-
cast the optimal couple (G∗,n). In this case, a group could start
when the trigger reaches the level corresponding to the ﬁrst horizon-
tal dotted-line, because they do not forecast an increasing level of G.
Subsequently, with the entry of this group of immigrants, the dimen-
sion of the district will increase at a higher level of G, reducing the
threshold. The explicit migration dynamic should be represented by
some jumps of lower and lower magnitudo with a decreasing thresh-
old;
2. The goverment is able to control the district size by imposing some limits
to the urbanisation of a peculiar area. In this case, let us assume that
the government thinks that a bound is required and publically declares
that the dimension of the districts will be ﬁx e da tag i v e nl e v e lG0.T h i s
action should reduce the number of migrants, because of a lower G respect
to the optimal level. But is this policy credible? And do the potential
immigrants really believe in this declaration? If immigrants believe the
government, the entry dynamics will follow the dotted line in quadrant V.
However, generally the government increases the permits for buildings if
the migration inﬂows increase. In this case, if migrants perfectly forecast
the optimal path (i.e. no bounds on the district size), the entry dynamic
will be the bold black line18.
she were the last to enter the community, or as if there were a forced order for the entry.
18Another hypothesis could be that migrants believe the government only once. When they
realise that the government is a "liar" they will perfectly forecast the optimal path. According
to this explanation, the dynamic decision will follow the dotted line until this touches the bold
black line and it will follow the bold black line, thereafter.
12Therefore, the ﬁnal:
Proposition 3 The static nature of the evolution of the district19 can strengthen
the hysteresis phenomenon of migration choice.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Real option theory suggests that migration may be delayed beyond the Marshal-
lian trigger since the option value of waiting may be suﬃciently positive in the
face of uncertainty. Intuition, as is well known from the pioneering work of Dixit
and Pindyck (1993), is that waiting may resolve uncertainty and thus enable
avoidance of the downside risk of an irreversible investment. Burda (1995) was
the ﬁrst to use real option theory to explain slow rates of migration from East
to West Germany despite a large wage diﬀerential. Subsequent works (Khwaja,
2002; Anam et al., 2004) have developed this approach describing the role of
uncertainty in the migration decision. In this work, we present a model where
each individual can choose to migrate to a host country depending on the wage
diﬀerential and an externality stemming from the community of individuals, in
the light of recent literature showing that the role of the community is important
for the migration decision (Moretti, 1998; Bauer et al., 2004). In our model,
the decision to migrate depends not only on the wage diﬀerential, but also on a
U-shaped function modelled according to the "theory of clubs". By studying the
Real Option Theory (Bartolini, 1995; Leahy, 1995; Moretto, 2003) in depth, it is
possible to implement Burda’s model with a possible co-ordination of migrants
to enter the host country. The theoretical results are able to give an explanation
to the observable "jumps" in the migration ﬂows and to describe how the trigger
of entry can change depending on the dimension of the district. In fact, given
a particular shape of the community beneﬁt function, the optimal entry policy
consists in co-ordinating migration altogether, when the beneﬁt received reaches
the maximum level: this explains the observable mass of immigrants entering a
host country. The analysis of the results also sheds light on the dynamics of the
districts’ development: some possible rigidities in the adjustment of the district
dimension, as regards the optimal levels, could magnify the hysteresis process.
19that is ﬁxed to a given G∗. This fact is an implicit consequence of assumption 7.
13A Appendix
Starting within a time interval where no new immigrants enter, i.e. n is ﬁxed,
the Bellman equation is:
ρV (x,n)dt =[ x + θu(n)]dt + E [dV (x,n)] (8)
Assuming V (x,n) to be a twice-diﬀerentiable function as regards x and
applying It
ˆ
o’s Lemma to expand dV (x,n), and also taking into account that n
is ﬁxed, we obtain:
1
2
Vxxσ2x2 + Vxαx − ρV (x,n)+[ x + θu(n)] = 0 (9)
The solution of (9) is given by the sum of the general solution for the homo-
geneous equation and of a particular solution for the inhomogeneous equation.
Therefore, a solution for the homogeneous equation must ﬁrst be found:
1
2
Vxxσ2x2 + Vxαx − ρV (x,n)=0 (10)




Vxx = β (β − 1)Axβ−2
Substituting into the homogeneous equation and dividing by Axβ leads to:
1
2
β (β − 1)σ2 + βα− ρ =0 (11)



















The general solution for the homogeneous equation (10) is:
V (x,n)=A(n)xβ1 + B (n)xβ2 (14)
















because the boundary conditions require that limx→∞ {V (x,n) − v(x,n)} =
0, where the second term in the limit represents the discounted present value
of the net beneﬁts ﬂows over an inﬁnitive horizon starting from x (Harri-
son, 1985, p.44) and from (14) to keep V (x,n) ﬁnite as x becomes small,
i.e. limx→0 V (x,n)=0 , we discard the term in the negative power of x set-
ting B =0 .








The last two terms represent the value of the migrant net beneﬁts in the
absence of a new entrant, then A(n)xβ1 is the correction due to a new entry
and A(n) must be negative. To determine this coeﬃcient we need to impose
some suitable boundary conditions. First of all, free entry requires the idle
migrant to expect zero beneﬁts on entry. Then, indicating by x∗ the value at
which the nth migrant is indiﬀerent between immediate entry or waiting another
opportunity, the matching value condition:








It is worth noting that the number of individuals n aﬀects V (x,n) depending
on x∗ and u(n). By totally diﬀerentiating as regards n we obtain:
dV (x∗ (n),n)
dn



















Moreover, since each individual rationally forecasts the future development
of the new entries by other migrants, at the optimal entry threshold, we obtain
Vn (x∗ (n),n)=A0(n)x∗ (n)
β1 +
θu0(n)
ρ =0(Bartolini, 1993; proposition 1).














(19) and (17) explain that either each individual exercises her entry option
at the level of x at which her value is tangent to the entry cost K,o rt h eo p t i m a l
x does not change with n. While the former case means that the value function
is smooth at entry and the trigger is a continuous function of n,t h el a t t e r
15case says that if this condition is not satisﬁed, the individual would beneﬁt
from marginally anticipating or delaying her entry decision. In particular if
Vx (x∗ (n),n) < 0( > 0), it means that the value function is expected to increase
(decrease) if x drops (rises). In both situations (19) is satisﬁed by imposing
dx∗(n)
dn =0 , then the same level of shock may either trigger entry by a positive
mass of migrants or lock-in the entry at the initial level of individuals.
A.1 Proof of Result 1: optimal trigger value with conges-
tion costs
Let us study the optimal trigger value in the decreasing part of the net beneﬁt
function (i.e. n ≥
_
n). We consider the value for a migrant starting at the point
(n, x < x∗), that would follow the optimal policy hereafter. Indicating by T
the ﬁrst time that x reaches the trigger x∗, n0 = n and x0 = x, the optimal
policy must then satisfy:






e−ρt [xt + θu(n)]dt +
∞ Z
T
e−ρt [xt + θu(n)]dt

 (20)
Using (17), knowing also that u(n) does not depend on the stochastic pro-
cess, we can write:





























































The expected values above can be found using standard results in the theory














20see Karlin and Taylor (1974, ch.7); Harrison and Taksar (1983); Harrison (1985, ch.3),































































From (25) we can observe that the threshold value is inversely correlated
with the U-shaped function of the net beneﬁts of the community. Therefore,
the greater the numbers of members in the community, the higher must be the
threshold value in order that the migrant could migrate.


























β1 (ρ − α)
< 0 (27)
Now we can observe that (27) is the solution of (19) and also, from Bartolini’s
assumptions, the solution of (18). Substituting (27) and (25) into (24), we obtain
(16).
By (25), we can observe that the community function aﬀects the thresh-
old value, reducing it for a decreasing quantity in the interval.[n,n]. This fact
implies that the congestion cost aﬀects the migrant’s decision and we have in-
creasing competition among the members of community. If the individual claims
to be unique or the last to enter the community, then A0(n)=0and the ﬁrst
order condition (18) reduces to Vx(n,X∗(n)) = 0.
A.2 Proof of Result 2: optimal trigger value with network
externalities
Studying of the threshold value in the decreasing part of the U-shaped beneﬁts
function, we stress that, in the interval [n,n], the optimisation problem induces
all immigrants to follow the same strategy: waiting until the trigger value
17reaches x∗(n). Assuming that all immigrants are equal and have the same
characteristics, they will leave their country in the same instant involving a
wave in the increasing part of the U-shaped function. A simple argument to
explain the optimal choice of the migrant, takes into consideration the idea that




ρ . It then follows easily that:









From the (28) is easy to observe two facts:
1. In (28) the diﬀerence is greater than zero when K>[θu(n)/ρ].T h i s
correction is due to a new entry into the community. This contradicts the
smooth pasting condition (19), explaining that it isn’t the optimality we
are searching for. The only point in order that 28 is equal to zero, is the
optimal one (we have in fact A(n)=0 );
2. The community eﬀect modiﬁes the beneﬁt obtained by the migrant. From
the smooth pasting condition we know that the optimality trigger is reached
when Vx(x∗(n),n)=0 ; therefore since the function is increasing with the
number of migrants, the greater the number of community members the
nearer x is to the optimal trigger.
As the function is decreasing in the observed interval, the upward jump
in beneﬁts would decrease as more immigrants have already entered and it
disappears when n = n where the value function is the known function (16). It
follows that the optimal level of wage gap x∗(n), that triggers entry, is where
the total beneﬁt ﬂow is maximum for all the discrete sizes of entrants (n − n).
It is at the maximum level when (19) is checked and when u0(n)=0 , i.e.
n = n. This will be shown in the next part.
Let’s assume that the migrant waits until the ﬁrst time the process x(n) rises
to the myopic21 trigger level κ ≡ x∗(ξ), corresponding to an immediate increase
of the community size to ξ>nand let us also assume that the immigrant
expects no more entry after ξ. Consequently, her expected payoﬀ V (x,ξ) from









Comparing (29) with (15) gives A(ξ)=0
Now, to obtain the constant A(n), subject to the claim that beyond ξ no























[u(ξ) − u(n)] (31)
As long as u(ξ) >u (n) the ﬁrst term in (31) is positive and it forecasts the
advantage the immigrant would experience by the entry of ξ − n immigrants
when x hits x∗.
If the migrant could decide the optimal time for entry, she would choose
when x reaches x∗ (n) and because all immigrants are equal, they coordinate a
simmultaneous entry into the host country and then into the economy.
B Coordination of Migrants
By using Moretto’s methodology (2003), we show that the best entry strategy for
each entrant pushes her to coordinate entering the country and the community.
The entrants decide to enter in mass, leading to an observable jump, when the
diﬀerential wage reaches the trigger level x∗ (n) at the maximum obtainable
level of beneﬁt.
Given a group of potential migrants n:
1. we consider a one-shot-discrete-time game between a generic ith migrant
and a pool of (n − n)−i <Nother migrants, called −ith. The pool of
migrants is considered like the other player;
2. the strategies of all immigrants are taken at ﬁxed times: t0 for x∗ (n) and
t1 for x∗ (n). From (6) and (7) is easy to observe that x∗ (n) <x ∗ (n)
and also that t1 >t 0. When the diﬀerential wage reaches x∗ (n) for the
ﬁrst time, she has an action set that is {Entry[E],N oE n t r y [NE]}. If
she decides to enter, her set is {Stay in} forever. If she doesn’t decide to
enter, she can wait for x∗ (n) to be reached before entering.
We use the following notation to describe the diﬀerent actions that can occur:
1. M (t0) is the expected discounted value of each migrant if all invest to-
gether at t0;
2. L(t0,t 1) is the (leader’s) discounted value for the migrant that enters at
t0, while all the others wait until t1;
193. F(t0,t 1) is the (follower’s) discounted value for the migrant that waits
until t1 before entering while the others make the move at t0;
4. MM(t1) means that at t1 it is always optimal to enter.
We have the following functions:





e−ρt (xt + θu(n))dt p xt0 = x∗ (n)
















































































































20It’s possible to show and demostrate that the payoﬀs of the four actions
described follow this disequality:
L(t0,t 1) <MM(t1) <F(t1) <M(t0) (38)
























because β1 > 1 and x∗ (n) <x ∗ (n) for every n 6= n and also because
x∗ (n) <x ∗ (n−i) <x ∗ (n+i) <x ∗ (n).
We summarise these result in the following table:
-i
EN E
EM , M L , _ i
NE F,_ MM,MM
Table 1
It is worth noting that there are only two candidates for the symmetric
Nash equilibria in pure strategies: ”all E”, ”all NE”,w h e r e”all E” is Pareto-
dominant22. Therefore for the migrant, it is optimal to coordinate reaching the
highest net beneﬁts obtainable from the decision to migrate. When the migrant
is on the increasing part of the beneﬁt function, she waits till the wage hits
the level x∗(n) (i.e. the maximum beneﬁt obtainable for a given dimension).
With regard to this fact, the best thing she can do is to co-operate with other
immigrants and to enter as a group at the threshold level x∗(n).
22Moretto (2003) shows that the equilibrium is also maintained with mixed strategy equi-
libria.
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